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ABSTRACT: The straw man fallacy consists in inappropriately constructing or selecting weak (or 
comparatively weaker) versions of the opposition's arguments. We will survey the three forms of 
straw men recognized in the literature, the straw, weak, and hollow man. We will then make the case 
that there are examples of inappropriately reconstructing stronger versions of the opposition's 
arguments. Such cases we will call iron man fallacies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
As some of recent work has shown, there is more to the problem of straw manning 
than the distortion of an opponent’s argument. Some forms of straw man, such as the 
weak man, rely on accurate, even scrupulously accurate, depictions of arguments for 
criticism. Other forms, such as the hollow man do not actually involve 
representations of anyone’s actual argument or view. Nonetheless, these strategies, 
and others to be discussed here, are dialectically problematic for much of the same 
reasons the distortion form of straw man is, in that they, to use some metaphorical 
language, misrepresent the dialogical lay of the land. We will argue here that two 
further features complete the account of the fallaciousness of the straw man: (1) a 
move to close the argument with the straw man victim (and those with similar 
views) and (2) a move to paint the straw man victim as unworthy of being taken 
seriously. What makes the varieties of straw man fallacious can also be used to show 
that not all forms of straw men arguments ought to be considered fallacious. Finally, 
the considerations that distinguish fallacious from non fallacious straw men also 
uncover a related phenomenon, iron manning, or the practice of making an 
opponent’s argument stronger than it is. We will argue that there are both 
SCOTT AIKIN AND JOHN CASEY 
 2 
appropriate and fallacious versions of this tactic. 
 
2. VARIETIES OF THE STRAW MAN 
 
Our aim in this section is to show that (1) there is a variety to the straw man, (2) 
there’s more involved in the phenomenon than manipulation of commitments ploys, 
and (3) that non fallacious, but formally identical variations of each of these forms 
exist.  
 
2.1 The representational form of straw man 
 
Let’s call the textbook form of the straw man the “representational form.” This 
consists in the first instance distortion of an opponent’s argument, followed by a 
decisive refutation. Consider: 
 
APA 
Philo:  A lot of people have suggested that the American 
Philosophical Association amend the practically 
obligatory Eastern APA interview on account of the 
expense, inconvenience, and stress for all involved.  
Sophia:  Come now Philo, I hardly think that completely 
abandoning the system is desirable, so we ought to 
reject their suggestions. 
 
APA meets the basic schematic requirements for the straw man in that we have (1) 
two arguers and (2) criticism of one by the other. We can also tell that the criticism 
here hinges on the representation of the first arguer’s position. The first arguer 
maintains that the APA ought to amend the Eastern APA hiring process because it is 
expensive, inconvenient, and stressful for everyone. But the second arguer attacks a 
related, but substantially different claim, namely that abandoning the system is 
ridiculous. Philo not suggested that the system be completely abandoned; rather, she 
has suggested that the APA amend the process. Sophia has misrepresented Philo's 
view, and dismissed the misrepresentation as weak.  
 
2.2 The weak man 
 
Consider another variation of the straw man argument. Call it the weak man. In its 
broad outlines, the weak man consists in (1) selecting the weakest of an opponent’s 
actual arguments, (2) actually defeating it, and (3) then drawing or implying deeper 
conclusions about the argument or the arguer in question. Consider the following 
exchange: 
  
Locavorism 
Serenity:  The culinary and ecological movement known as 
“locavorism” maintains that favoring sustainably and 
ethically raised local and seasonal produce is superior 
SCOTT AIKIN AND JOHN CASEY 
 3 
to the more dominant industrial model.  
After all, it does not depend on petroleum-intensive 
fertilizer, it’s not transported across the country (or the 
world in many cases), and it sustains local agricultural 
economies.  
Archer:  The claims of the locavorism movement are ludicrous, 
the alleged fuel savings in food transportation amount 
to very little if any overall petroleum savings. 
Locavorism is loco.   
  
In this case, the locavore maintains that a number of different reasons 
independently and convergently support the single conclusion that locavorism is a 
wiser policy than high intensity industrial agriculture. The critic singles out one of 
them, the alleged fuel savings, and refutes it, implying he has dealt a blow to the 
argument as a whole. The locavorism critic might even have an especially decisive 
and sound argument, but even granted that, much would remain to consider in favor 
of locavorism. The weak manner hopes to exaggerate the importance of the weak 
argument, but barring that, he can focus critical scrutiny on the ideological fellow 
travelers of the person making the weak argument 
 
2.3 The hollow man 
 
In a third variation of the straw man, one invents an entirely fictitious and decisively 
silly position, attributes it to a purportedly real, but vaguely defined opponent, 
knocks it down, and thereby suggests the opposition isn’t worthy of rational 
discussion. The “tell” for this version of the straw man, is often the infamous “some 
say” or “some might say” phrase that obscures the identity and therefore absolves 
the speaker of the charge of lying. Many of you are likely familiar with the 
controversy surrounding Rush Limbaugh's tendency to make jarring remarks. 
Unsurprisingly many have rushed to his defense. Among them was the Wall Street 
Journal’s Peggy Noonan: 
  
Peggy Noonan 
“Why would the left be worse? Let me be harsh. Some left-wing men 
think they can talk like this because they're on the correct side on 
social issues such as abortion. Their attitude: ‘I backed you on the 
abortions you want so much, I opposed a ban on partial birth. Hell, I'll 
let you kill kids at any point until they're 15, I'm cool. And that means 
I can call women in public life t – - – s, right? Because, you know, I 
think of them that way.’” (WSJ 3/16/2012) 
 
Like the weak man, the hollow man does not involve distorting any argument so 
much as inventing an entirely new one. In this example, Noonan does not bother to 
identify the bearer of the view other than to say that “some left-wing men” think 
this.  
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3. ARE THERE LEGITIMATE USES OF THE STRAW MAN?  
  
The various schemes of straw men are defined by the way one arguer represents the 
views of another: badly, selectively, or falsely. The question is whether one can 
badly, selectively, or falsely represent someone’s views without being guilty of 
fallacy.  
 Consider: it would be very hard to teach philosophy without employing some 
variation on the straw man scheme frequently and energetically. With regard to this 
reason, Ribiero notes that (2008) that distortions formally identical to straw man 
distortions occur frequently in the classroom from pedagogical need: (1) historical 
interest, (2) pedagogical ease, (3) and practical availability. There seems, in fact, to 
be an intuitive case for using the various schemes of the straw man pedagogically. 
Representational straw men might be employed to drive home particular 
pedagogical points. A teacher of music, for instance, might exaggerate the bad habit 
of her music student:  
 
Music Teacher 
Music teacher to student: you need to work on your intonation. At the 
moment it sounds like a tortured cat. 
 
The teacher has distorted the student’s behavior by hyperbole, but the point is to fix 
the student’s awareness on her poor intonation. A similar case might be made for 
the other two straw man ploys. A weak man might be used as practice.  
 
Gay Marriage 
Brad:  I’ve heard quite a number of arguments against gay 
marriage in the conservative press lately.  
Angelina: I have too. I heard one particularly bad one 
from a blogger at RedState.com:he argued that if 
homosexuals are allowed to marry, nothing would 
prevent him from marrying his box turtle. 
Brad:  Wow, that’s hilarious. 
 
In this example, Brad signals that there are several arguments against gay marriage. 
We can imagine that some are better than others. Angelina responds by attacking 
what is likely to be weakest of them, a kind of textbook version of the slippery slope 
fallacy. Answering it first improves further discussion.  
 For a hollow man case, continue our pedagogical consideration. Open just 
about any introductory logic text, and one will find the exercise sections full of 
arguments few sensible people would make (though we're often disabused of this 
notion). It’s just easier, however, to do it this way, for the point of the fallacy 
exercise is to get at the form of argument, not to pin failings on specific people 
 Though all of these examples fit the straw man ploy in its various forms, none 
of them are in our view fallacious. In Music Teacher, the instructor attacks an 
exaggerated version of the student’s performance to highlight a difficult to 
appreciate pedagogical point. In Gay Marriage, Angelina goes straight for the 
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weakest of the arguments for the anti-gay marriage position, and so weak mans that 
view. But she does not draw the inference that this view is representative of the best 
of the opposition. Weak manning sometimes serves the dialectical purpose of 
clearing away weak arguments, which nonetheless may have a lot of adherents, and 
which nonetheless occupy much in demand dialectical space.  
These representative, but non fallacious, straw man ploys highlight two 
important features about what makes most straw man arguments fallacious in the 
first place. The fallaciousness does not primarily consist in the distortion of 
someone else’s argument (as in the representational straw man), in the purposeful 
selection of the weakest of someone’s arguments (as in the weak man), or finally in 
the invention of weak arguments or arguers (as in the hollow man); all of these can 
be very useful dialectical tools. What makes these tactics fallacious is how they are 
deployed. The varieties of straw man are fallacious if they are deployed (1) to close 
off argument prematurely and (2) illegitimately impugn an opposing arguer’s 
competence. So, for instance, the hollow man is fallacious when one makes up an 
idiotic argument, knocks it down, in order to suggest that the opposition, however 
vaguely defined, lacks sufficient critical skill, as in the Peggy Noonan example above. 
Such people’s views are unserious and not worthy of further consideration. The 
other two examples show a similar tendency to tar the target with an accusation of a 
bad argument. In APA, the arguer is alleged to have made an extreme suggestion; in 
Locavorism, the arguer is alleged to be insufficiently reflective or to associate with 
insufficiently reflective people.  
  
4. IRON MANNING 
 
If what makes the varieties of straw men fallacious is their exclusionary, or closing, 
function, then it is easier to distinguish fallacious cases of straw manning from non 
fallacious ones.  
The fallaciousness of strawman arguments is indexed to context. Views or 
arguments that warrant careful consideration in one situation may not deserve 
them in another. This means at times it may be permissible (and necessary) to exclude 
some views from consideration on the basis of cursory arguments. In other words, 
while fallacious straw men involve the exclusion of arguments or arguers from 
justly deserved consideration, in light of the function of the straw man to distort 
over time, there is good reason to think that unreasonably or overly charitable 
interpretations of arguments (of arguers) can also qualify as fallacious. It’s certainly 
fallacious, in other words, to distort a person’s argument in order more easily to it 
knock down (and malign the person as a competent arguer); however, by parity of 
reasoning, a charitable distortion to present an unserious arguer as serious is 
equally problematic. We call this the iron man. Consider the following cases. 
 
4.1 Eric Cantor 
 
Eric Cantor is the Republican Majority Whip in the House of Representatives. In an 
interview with Leslie Stahl on CBS's 60 Minutes (1/1/2012), Stahl asked Cantor to 
square the fact that Ronald Reagan raised taxes during a recession with the current 
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Republican Party view--allegedly inspired by Reagan--that taxes ought never to be 
raised. In response, Cantor denied that Reagan ever raised taxes. His spokesperson 
interrupted the interview, alleging that Stahl did not have her facts straight. She did. 
Coming to Cantor's defense, one blogger (Jim Hoft) made the following claim: 
 
Stahl, was not being honest. When Ronald Reagan took office, the top 
individual tax rate was 70 percent and by 1986 it was down to only 28 
percent. All Americans received at least a 30 percent tax rate cut. 
Democrats like to play with the numbers to pretend that Reagans [sic] 
tax increases equalled [sic] his tax cuts. Of course, this is absurd.  
 
… Unfortunately, Steve Benen at the Washington Monthly continued 
to misrepresent Reagan’s record on tax cuts. It’s just soooo difficult 
for liberals to understand that tax cuts work. Sad. 
 
Notice that Hoft has offered a different and (much more defensible) view on behalf 
of Cantor: on aggregate, taxes were lower after Reagan's years in office than before. 
This was not the point under consideration. The net effect of this is to distort the 
proper evaluation of Cantor’s claim and Stahl’s criticism.  
 
4.2 Westboro Baptist Church 
 
The Westboro Baptist Church is known for demonstrating at the funerals of fallen 
soldiers. At their protests, they hold up signs alleging that the death of the person is 
God’s punishment for the tolerance of homosexuality in America. In light of this, 
consider the following exchange. 
 
Sally:  The Westboro Baptist Church boycotted my local 
synagogue, carrying signs that say “God hates fags.” 
Their views are patently ridiculous; far from even the 
fringe of conservative Christianity. People should just 
ignore them. 
 
Priscilla:  Yes, but aren’t they really suggesting that our fate as a 
nation is bound up with the moral fibre of the American 
people? As we lose our sense of commitment, 
steadfastness, and courage, we will not realize our 
plans. 
 
Priscilla raises some interesting points, but they are vaguely related to the actual 
content of the Westboro Church’s protests and Sally’s objection. The question is 
whether these particular arguments from the Westboroites deserve consideration. 
And so iron-manning can be an occasion for broader discussion, but one iron mans 
so that we do not have to discuss this particular argument. 
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4.3 Philosophy student I 
 
We have discussed above how teaching philosophy to undergraduates often 
depends on strategically employed, non-fallacious straw men. As it is necessary 
sometimes to straw man views, it is also necessary to iron man the student’s view. 
With this in mind, imagine the following teacher-student exchange. 
 
Alfredo:  Rawls’ “Original Position” seems impossible to me. I 
mean, how are we to know what sorts of things we’ll be 
interested in if we don’t know anything about 
ourselves? 
 
Professor Zoccolo: That’s an interesting point, Alfredo, you’re 
suggesting that Rawls’s Original Position does not take 
cognizance of how we are constituted by our social 
relations. Thinking them through abstractly seems 
problematic. 
 
Alfredo’s view certainly trends communitarian, but it would be a stretch to suggest 
that this is what he meant. Unlike the previous cases, however, iron-manning 
Alfredo shows him how to improve his contributions to the discussion.  
 
4.4 Philosophy student II 
 
The norm of iron-manning student views can yield good results. It shows students 
how to improve their thoughts. However, it can yield classroom disaster, as it can 
encourage more poorly stated views. Iron-manning the student makes it such that 
the teacher does the work in crafting the views. Moreover, time in the classroom is 
too short to take all the off-the-wall views seriously. Sometimes, iron-manning 
undercuts a serious classroom. Consider: 
 
Professor Barleycorn: Descartes’ argument in the First Meditation is 
that very little of what we take ourselves to know 
securely is certain. It may all be a dream. Or it may all be 
an illusion of a very powerful demon.  
 
Bradley:  Dude! I had a dream like that one night – that I was in 
the clutches of an evil demon. And he made me do 
things… like terrible things… to chickens. And then, 
when I woke up… it was all true. The terrible stuff to 
chickens stuff, that is. That was all after I drank too 
much cough syrup with my beers. Did Day-Cart have a 
Robitussin problem?  
 
Bradley is way off base. For sure, his weird story deserves a moment of reply, but it 
is best for all involved that a lengthy analysis of Bradley’s views on the matter aren’t 
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devoted class time. Some views are best left unexamined. Next time, Bradley should 
read. And lay off the syrup. 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
 
From these cases, the basic form of iron man argumentation can be discerned. First, 
as a dialectical form, the iron man requires two speakers, A and B. A proposes some 
argument a and/or some position p. But a and p are not defensible. B takes up with 
A’s case with a reconstruction, a* and p*, that given the state of dialectical play are 
(comparatively more) defensible. Often this strategy is done for the sake of an 
onlooking audience, C, which may be interested in A’s views or the issue of whether 
that p. So far, again, we can see that there is a dialectical distortion, just as there is 
with straw-manning, but instead of degrading the opponent’s argument (as with the 
straw man), the opponent’s case is improved. Hence our term iron man. 
There are compelling epistemic reasons to regularly iron man one’s 
opposition, as the truth will come out in contexts of maximally responsible and 
detailed argumentation. Since our epistemic objectives in argument are truth and its 
understanding, the most intellectually robust opponent is the best, and if one does 
not encounter but must construct such an opponent, then so be it. Moreover, there 
are ethical (and political) reasons why iron-manning may be appealing. At its core, 
iron-manning is a form of interpreting others communicative acts with charity. The 
demands of recognition, further, for underrepresented groups obtain so that their 
interests can be heard and have effect. Iron-manning is in the service of this. Finally, 
again, there are pedagogical reasons why iron-manning may be required.  
 So what, then, could be wrong with iron-manning? We hold that there is a 
fallacy of inclusion for the same reason that there is a fallacy of exclusion.  
 Let us return to the cases. As we saw with Philosophy Student II, there are 
pedagogical reasons why iron-manning can be objectionable, as the point of class 
discussion is for students to improve their own views, not having it done for them. It 
is here that we begin to see the trouble with some forms of iron-man: in taking some 
poorly articulated views seriously, improving them and submitting them to scrutiny, 
one makes an investment of time and intellectual energy. The trouble is that there 
are many investments that are unwise. Consider, further, a feature of discussion 
after content presentation. There is evidence now that suggests that rude or 
irrelevant online comments after a posting or story actually distort reading 
comprehension of the original piece. That is, the more comments that don’t get the 
original point you are exposed to or the more rude comments in the discussion 
thread, the less likely it is that you will, afterwards, correctly recall the details of the 
posting. This is now being called, “The Nasty Effect.” Derailed discussion not only is 
a waste of time, but it is miseducation.  
 Now consider the strategic use of iron-manning with the Eric Cantor case. 
The trouble is not with improving the view per se, but with the way the 
improvement is deployed. In this case, (a) the iron man is presented as Cantor’s 
view, and (b) thereby it is used as evidence that Stahl is (and liberals generally are) 
fact challenged. But this is a distortion not only of Cantor’s position, but of Stahl’s, 
too. By iron-manning Cantor, one straw-mans Stahl, his critic. Her criticisms now 
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seem off-target and ill-informed, when they, in fact, were not. 
 These two elements of iron-manning converge. When one iron mans a poorly 
presented view, one may encourage those who have posed the view by taking them 
seriously, and thereby impugn their critics. Again, sometimes this is appropriate, as 
some views need time and patience for their development and some speakers 
require maximal charity in interpreting their communicative acts. But sometimes it 
is inappropriate, as one can be held hostage by these speakers. On blog comment 
threads and chatboards, there are many who are uninformed and contribute with 
unhinged criticism. They are out to hijack discussion, to hold forth, to be the center 
of attention. These are, in internet lingo, trolls. Taking the trolls seriously, 
interpreting them with charity, and responding to them thoughtfully yields only 
grief. One must not feed the trolls.  
 Indeed, too often philosophers and informal logicians overlook the fact we 
very often find ourselves having to evaluate just this argument from this arguer, 
even if this argument could be stronger, or this arguer could use some help. We have 
argued here that even charitable alterations of arguments or arguers distort the 
dialectical landscape are often unacceptable, for exactly the same reason why straw-
manning is unacceptable. The only difference is that the straw man excludes 
arguments worth listening to; the iron man includes arguments not worth listening 
to. In all, we’ve identified a few rough criteria for knowing when iron-manning is 
fallacious: 
 
1.  When it is clear that the argument to be reconstructed is not likely to 
be either relevant or successful. 
2.  When it is clear that the improvement of and response to the 
argument will take more time than is allotted, and there are other, 
more clearly salient, issues. 
3.  When, even if 1 & 2 do not obtain (that is, when there may be 
something relevant and  there is plenty of surplus time and 
energy), it is clear that responding to this speaker under these 
circumstances encourages further badly formed arguments. 
4.  When the positive reconstruction of the argument (iron man) in 
question yields mis-portrayal of the arguments prior critics as 
attacking a straw man. 
 
This rough set of criteria are, in the end, an overlap of (a) issues in cognitive 
economy (maximizing epistemic efficiency), and (b) issues in maintenance of a 
properly run dialectical field. We hold 1&2 are epistometric questions, and 3&4 are 
dialectical questions. Hence, the basic thought that sometimes feeding the trolls is 
(a) a waste of time and energy, and (b) it ultimately isn’t anything but bad for the 
way we argue.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
We have argued in this paper that the dialectical phenomenon known as straw 
manning is much more varied than many accounts suggest. In the first place, straw 
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manning involves more than simple distortion. It also includes forms of selection 
(weak manning) and invention (hollow manning). Second, not all instances of straw 
manning are fallacious. Finally, and somewhat ironically, charitable variations on an 
argument suffer from the same failings as fallacious straw men, though their 
mistake lies in the inclusion of arguments deserving of exclusion. 
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